Speculative capital and currency carry trades by Jylha, P & Suominen, M
 
         
  
Speculative Capital and  
Currency Carry Trades 
  
 
Petri Jylhä and Matti Suominen* 
 
 
First version: April 18, 2008 
Current version: June 1, 2010 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study a two-country general equilibrium model with partially segmented financial 
markets, where hedge funds emerge endogenously. Empirically, we show that the hedge fund 
investment strategy predicted by our model, which we call the “risk-adjusted carry trade” strategy, 
explains more than 16% of the overall hedge fund index returns and more than 33% of the fixed 
income arbitrage sub-index returns. The flow of new money to hedge funds affects market interest 
rates, exchange rates, and both the hedge funds’ contemporaneous and expected future returns as 
predicted by the model. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study currency speculation by hedge funds. In the theoretical part of 
the paper, we study a two-country general equilibrium model with partially segmented financial 
markets, where hedge funds emerge endogenously. As in Fama and Farber (1979), the interest rates 
and the foreign exchange rate are determined by the two countries’ inflation risks and money 
supplies. In our model, some of the agents are restricted, and can invest only in domestic fixed 
income securities, while others, speculators, can borrow and invest freely in all available fixed 
income securities. When the number of speculators is small, and the two countries’ inflation shocks 
are highly correlated, all speculators invest in a hedge fund that borrows from the country with the 
lower Sharpe ratio for fixed income securities and invests in the country with the higher Sharpe 
ratio. We refer to this strategy as the “risk-adjusted carry trade” investment strategy. When the 
barriers to international investments are reduced, more investors invest in the hedge fund. The flow 
of new money to the hedge fund affects market interest rates, the exchange rate, the hedge fund’s 
leverage, and both its contemporaneous and expected future returns.1   
 
Empirically, we test the predictions of the model using a sample of 11 currencies and 
30 years of data. First, our results show that hedge funds do, in fact, engage in the type of currency 
speculation that our model predicts. The returns from a simple investment strategy, where long and 
short currency portfolios are formed on the basis of the rankings of the currencies by their expected 
Sharpe ratios, explains more than 16% of the overall hedge fund index returns and more than 33% 
of the fixed income arbitrage sub-index returns. The explanatory power of our strategy’s returns is 
significant even when controlling for the seven Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors that are commonly 
used to explain hedge fund returns. Under certain assumptions, the investment strategy predicted by 
                                                 
1 The foreign exchange market has historically been partly segmented due to various barriers in foreign 
exchange transactions. Also, behavioral barriers, for instance due to lack of knowledge or overestimation of risks, may 
be important. 
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our model is identical to the simple carry trade investment strategy, where the long and short 
portfolios are formed on the basis of interest rate and not Sharpe ratio rankings. Empirically, the 
returns and portfolio compositions of these two strategies are highly correlated and the returns from 
the simple carry trade strategy explain equally well the returns of various hedge fund indexes. 
 
Second, we show that the increased hedge fund assets under management (AUM) and 
positive inflows of funds to hedge funds decrease the expected returns from the two carry trade 
strategies, and decrease interest rates in high Sharpe ratio (high interest rate) countries while 
increasing the interest rates in low Sharpe ratio (low interest rate) countries. In addition, the flow of 
funds to hedge funds affects exchange rates, appreciating (depreciating) the exchange rate of the 
high (low) Sharpe ratio, or high (low) interest rate, currencies. In the fall of 2008, there was a large 
outflow of funds from the hedge fund industry. In accordance with our theoretical predictions and 
empirical results, the effect was opposite to hedge fund inflows and as a result of the large outflows 
from the funds, the low Sharpe ratio (low interest rate) currencies appreciated significantly relative 
to the high Sharpe ratio (high interest rate) currencies.2 
 
Our paper is connected to an emerging stream of literature on partial market 
segmentation and limited speculative capital. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) study a segmented market 
model, similar to ours, where some investors are only allowed to invest in one of the two risky 
assets, whereas others are allowed to invest in both. In Vayanos and Vila (2009), fixed income 
markets are endogenously segmented by investors’ differing preferences for different maturities 
(preferred habitat), while a limited number of arbitrageurs act as a market integrating force. Their 
model is tested empirically in Greenwood and Vayanos (2008). In these papers, the capital engaged 
in speculation is limited by either speculators’ financing constraints or their risk aversion. Other 
                                                 
2 The currency movements in the fall of 2008 were extreme: For instance, the currency with the lowest interest rate, the 
Japanese yen, appreciated relative to the currency with the highest interest rate, the British pound, by 40% in just a few 
months. 
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papers that study models with limited speculative capital include DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kyle and Xiong (2001), and Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009). One recent paper in this strand of literature—which is very close in spirit to ours 
and deals with currency speculation—is Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009). Empirically, 
they show that carry trades are subject to currency crash risk, i.e., the exchange rate movements of 
carry trade portfolios are negatively skewed. They argue that the skewness in foreign exchange 
rates follows from temporary changes in the availability of funding liquidity to speculators. A 
temporary reduction in funding liquidity results in a rapid unwinding of traders’ positions and thus 
leads to abrupt changes in exchange rates, which go against the carry traders. This risk, the authors 
argue, is a major factor affecting traders’ willingness to enter into these “risk arbitrage” positions 
and arbitrage away the positive returns to carry trades. Their risk-based explanation of carry trade 
returns complements ours and our finding that hedge fund flows affect both contemporaneous and 
expected carry trade returns.3, 4  
 
Second, our paper is related to the literature on carry trade profitability, such as 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan 
(2008). We argue, and provide evidence, that one driver of the profitability of the simple carry trade 
strategy is the number of funds engaging in carry trades. Third, our results are related to the 
literature on the forward premium puzzle, that is, the observed failure of the uncovered interest rate 
parity (see, e.g., Bilson, 1981; Fama, 1984; Froot and Thaler, 1990; Bekaert, 1996; Engel, 1996; or 
Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000).5 In line with Fama and Farber (1979) and Grossman (1995), our 
                                                 
3 One additional related paper is Gârleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009), which examines the pricing of different 
option contracts when market makers’ ability to engage in arbitrage is limited. 
4 Also related is the earlier literature on segmented markets and covered interest rate parity. See, for instance, Keynes 
(1923), Einzig (1961), and Grubel (1965). See also Prachowny (1970), who studies deviations from covered interest 
rate parity in a model with less than infinitely elastic supply and demand of forward currency. 
5 Other relevant papers on this topic include Cumby (1988), Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993), Bekaert, Hodrick, 
and Marshall (1997), Hollifield and Uppal (1997), Mark and Wu (1998), Roll and Yan (2000), Backus, Foresi, and 
Telmer (2001), Lyons (2001), Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Albuquerque (2008), Farhi 
and Gabaix (2008), Wagner (2008), Alvarez, Atkenson, and Kehoe (2009), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2009), Burnside, 
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results suggest that the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity is due to compensation for risks. 
In addition, however, our evidence suggests that the historically observed large returns to strategies 
exploiting the forward premium puzzle, such as carry trades, were due to segmented markets and 
the gradual integration of fixed income securities markets during the past few decades.6 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the model and 
in Section 3 the theoretical results. Sections 4–8 contain the empirical part of the paper. We present 
the data in Section 4. In Section 5, we study whether hedge funds are involved in currency 
speculation. In Section 6, we study how hedge fund flows affect the returns from currency 
speculation. In Section 7, we look at the effect of hedge fund flows on interest rates, while in 
Section 8 we examine their effect on exchange rates. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
Our model combines elements from Fama and Farber (1979) and Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2006). Our main point of departure from the former is to assume partially segmented 
financial markets. Consider a model with two countries i ∈ {A,B}. In both countries, there are N 
citizens, where N is normalized to one. The citizens produce and consume a single commodity and, 
as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), use money in the production of this commodity. Money 
used in production in period t is recovered at its full nominal value at the beginning of the next 
period t+1. In particular, we assume that country i’s citizens’ production function generates )m(f t,i  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Burnside, Han, Hirshleifer, and Wang (2010), Plantin and Shin (2010), and Verdelhan 
(2010). 
6 Finally, our paper is also related to the hedge fund literature. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) and Wang and Zheng 
(2008) show a positive contemporaneous relation between hedge fund flows and returns and Wang and Zheng (2008) 
and Avramov, Barars, and Kosowski (2009) find evidence of a negative relation between flows and future returns. Our 
study offers one channel through which flows have a positive return effect on the existing positions but decrease the 
future expected returns. Our results also complement those of Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and 
Wermers (2007) who study the impact of hedge funds on the financial markets as a whole.  
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goods in period t+1, where t,im  denotes agents’ real money holdings of country i’s currency in 
period t. We assume that )m(f t,i  is increasing and concave in tim , . 
 
The purchasing power of country i’s money in period t is denoted by πi,t, so that M 
units of country i’s currency have a real purchasing power of t,im  = Mπi,t. The future purchasing 
power of money is random at time t, so that given information available at time t, 
          
       (1) 
 
Here, Et refers to the expectation operator conditioned on time t information set and a tilde on top of 
a variable is used to denote a random variable.7  
 
Besides money, there are two other storage technologies in each country: first, a risk-
free asset that pays a periodic constant real return rf, and second, a one-period default free zero-
coupon bond, sold at a real market price pi,t, that pays one unit of country i’s nominal currency at 
time t+1. The risk in this asset comes from the uncertain purchasing power of money in period t+1. 
Both risky assets are in zero net supply. Like Fama and Farber (1979), we assume that all 
consumers first hedge their money holdings in the bond market, and only then look at their 
investments into bonds. In this case, the effective supply of zero-coupon bonds in the market, 
denoted in country i’s currency, is country i’s money supply, .M i   
 
Our consumers are myopic. Like Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), we assume 
overlapping generations of agents, who live for two periods, invest when they are young and 
                                                 
7 We take the expected future purchasing power of money 1,
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+titE π  as exogenous to the model, as it is 
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consume when they are old.8 Before dying, they sell their money holdings to the next generation. 
To obtain closed form expressions for asset prices, we assume that period t investors value their 
random period t+1 consumption using a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, 
1
~
1 )~( +
−
+ −=
tca
tt eEcu , where a denotes the parameter of risk aversion and 1~ +tc  their random 
consumption in period t+1. Furthermore, let us denote by t,ib  the quantity of country i’s nominal 
zero-coupon bonds, with a face value of one, that an agent purchases (or sells) in period t in 
addition to his short position in country i’s bonds, that comes from hedging his currency holdings.9 
Similarly, let t,jb  refer to purchases of country j’s bonds.
  
 
We assume that the financial markets are segmented in the following way: a fraction 
)1( ik− > 0 of country i’s investors have prohibitively high transaction costs of investing abroad, 
i.e., to hold money or interest-bearing securities in a foreign currency. Fraction ki of country i’s 
investors, on the other hand, are unrestricted. We call the restricted investors “domestic investors” 
and the unrestricted ones, “speculators.” In both countries, there is a one-time cost φ of becoming a 
speculator and the number of speculators is determined endogenously.10 In contrast to the financial 
markets, there are no barriers, such as tariffs or transportation costs, in the product market.11 
                                                 
8 Other papers that assume myopic agents in dynamic asset pricing models include Campbell, 
Grossman, and Wang (1993) and Vives (1995).   
9 If an agent’s real money holdings are mi,t, we assume he sells short Mi,t = mi,t / πi,t zero-coupon bonds 
to hedge his money holdings before considering any other investments into bonds. 
10 In our model, φ proxies for several different types of real and informational barriers to becoming a 
currency trader. Examples of these are all regulatory barriers, the direct costs from setting up a currency account, with a 
facility for foreign currency borrowing, and the costs from acquiring information on the expected returns and risks 
related to currency trading. In the theoretical part below, we study what happens when φ decreases. This is motivated by 
the observation that the barriers to currency trading most likely decreased during our sample period, i.e., during the last 
three decades. This, we argue, occurred due to 1) loosening of foreign exchange controls and the associated financial 
market integration, 2) the emergence of currency hedge funds that are marketed to an ever-increasing fraction of the 
population, 3) the globalization of media that has increased awareness of currency trading opportunities, and 4) 
academic research that has pointed out the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity and provided investors with 
estimates of the historical returns to currency carry trades.       
11 This assumption is made for simplicity and because of the focus of the paper. Including some barriers 
in the product market, such as tariffs and transportation costs, and studying the product market flows, and deviations 
from purchasing power parity (PPP), might bring some additional economic insights but would result in a more 
complicated model. 
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Therefore, assuming period t investors are endowed with a real wealth wt, after 
choosing whether to become a speculator, country i’s investors at time t maximize:  
 
                            (2) 
                    
 
Here, Is is an indicator function that takes the value of one if and only if the investor is a speculator. 
The second constraint in the agents’ maximization problem is related to financial market 
segmentation as follows: for domestic investors, x = 0, while for speculators, x = ∞. Equilibrium 
prevails when each agent’s action maximizes his expected utility. Finally, note that country i’s 
citizens do not benefit from country j’s currency in their production activities. 
 
3. Equilibrium and model predictions 
3.1. Equilibrium 
 There are no restrictions in the product market. Therefore, for all currency transactions, 
purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that the period t exchange rate, at which country j’s currency 
can be exchanged to country i’s currency, is:  
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we use a superscript d to denote a domestic investor and a superscript s to denote a speculator. In 
other words, if the speculators buy ( ) st,iji bkk +  units of country i’s bonds, we define dt,iM  as:  
 
( )
.
1
,
,
i
s
tijiid
ti k
bkkM
M
−
+−
=                     (4) 
 
Here, we have assumed, as we show later to be the case, that speculators from both countries hold 
identical bond portfolios. The sub-index i in stib ,  refers to the country in whose currency the 
investment is made. Now, setting x = 0 in (2), taking expectations and the first-order condition of 
(2) with respect to domestic investors’ bond holdings, dt,ib , and using the market clearing condition, 
d
t,ib =
d
t,iM , we obtain that the price of the zero-coupon bond, t,ip , in country i at time t is:  
 
            (5) 
      
The expected real return from investing in the nominal bonds, i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate, 
tir , , is:  
 
     (6) 
 
 
The standard deviation of the real return from investing in nominal bonds of country i is .p/ t,iiσ  
Therefore, the Sharpe ratio for the real returns from bond investments is: 
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These results show that the bond price (interest rate) is decreasing (increasing) in the 
parameter of risk aversion, a, inflation risk, iσ , and the per capita supply of bonds in the domestic 
market, dt,iM . In the case of an autarky, where kA and kB are zero, 
d
t,iM = iM , the local money 
supply. In such perfectly segmented markets, the Sharpe ratio for bonds is higher in the country 
with the higher per capita inflation risk, iiM σ .
12 Let us denote by H the country with the higher per 
capita inflation risk and by L the country with the lower per capita inflation risk. In the case of 
autarkies, the higher Sharpe ratio in country H, as compared to country L, is necessary to attract 
sufficient investment into the risky bonds of country H, in order to clear the market, despite the 
higher amount of risk being sold. 
 
Let us now look at the speculators’ problem. The first order condition of (2) with 
respect to the speculators’ investment into country i’s bonds, 
s
ti,b , implies:  
 
                                                                                                   (8) 
 
Again, the i and j sub-indexes refer to the currency in which the investment is made. Using (4) and 
(5) in (8), we can now solve for the equilibrium bond holdings. Solving the set of equations, we 
obtain that, in equilibrium, all speculators hold 
 
                                                                (9) 
   
                                                 
12 Here, per capita inflation risk simply refers to the total amount of inflation risk in the money supply 
of a given currency divided by the number of investors in that country. This is the amount of inflation risk that each 
investor must carry in equilibrium in an autarky.  
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of country i’s bonds, while the domestic investors hold 
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of such bonds. The asterisk is used to denote an equilibrium value. Using (10) in Eqs. (5), (6) and 
(7) gives us an easy characterization of the equilibrium interest rates, bond prices, and the Sharpe 
ratios of bonds in our economy.  
 
Given (3), the exchange rate is determined by the purchasing power of the two 
currencies as follows: Taking the first-order condition of (2) with respect to mi,t, we obtain that for 
both the speculators and the domestic investors:  
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Recall that )M(f)m(f t,iit,i π=  is an increasing and concave function of mi,t. This implies that it is 
also an increasing and concave function of πi,t. Assuming that inflation risk is small enough so that 
country i’s bond price (5) is positive, this implies that g( iM ,πi,t) is a strictly increasing function of 
πi,t, so that for every iM , it has an inverse function g-1( iM ,pi,t) = ti,π  that is strictly increasing in 
pi,t. The exchange rate can now be stated as a function of the two countries zero-coupon bond prices 
as follows: 
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Let us now look at the determination of the number of speculators. As ki < 1 by 
assumption, it must be that the benefit of becoming a speculator is less than or equal to the cost of 
becoming one. In other words, 
  
 
                                      (13) 
 
 
Using (5) and (10), we can rewrite (13) as: 
 
       (14) 
 
Furthermore, Eqs. (13) and (14) must hold as strict equalities when ki > 0. From (14), it is easy to 
see that, as the condition is symmetric apart from the first term, the first speculators come from 
country L, as for an arbitrary small number of speculators idi Mb ≈  and LLHH MM σσ > . Speculators 
from country H enter only after H
d
HL
d
L MM σσ = , or alternatively, given (7), when the Sharpe ratios of 
the bonds in the two countries are equal. We have now completed the characterization of the 
equilibrium. 
 
3.2. Hedge funds, hedge fund flows, interest rates, and exchange rates  
As we demonstrate below, in segmented markets, the speculators invest in a hedge 
fund. Let us start by defining the following two critical parameters:  
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                                                                                                                                                         (15)  
 
and  
                                                                                                  (16) 
 
 
For reasons provided in Proposition 1, we call ρ  the minimal level of inflation risk correlation to 
induce speculation and Lk  the minimal degree of segmentation needed to induce speculation. 
 
We now move on to our propositions, which are proved in Appendix A.  
 
Proposition 1. When correlation between inflation shocks is high enough, ρρ > , and the markets 
are sufficiently segmented, LL kk < , the speculators’ portfolio is a “currency hedge fund” with a 
short position in currency L and a long position in currency H. The expected returns to the 
speculators’ hedge fund are positive. The leverage in the speculators’ hedge fund, as defined by 
*s
Lb− , approaches infinity when ρ → 1 and max{kL,kH} → 0. The leverage decreases as the number 
of speculators increases. 
 
Here, as well as below, we refer to the speculators’ collective portfolio as a hedge 
fund when it contains both short and long positions in currencies. As all speculators hold identical 
portfolios, it is as if they all invested their wealth in the same fund. It is interesting to note that in 
our model the speculators’ fund is a hedge fund only in sufficiently segmented markets, i.e., when 
market segmentation exceeds the minimal degree of segmentation needed to induce speculation 
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(i.e., when LL kk < ). In more integrated markets, where LL kk > , the speculators’ investments are 
“long only.” It is intuitive that there are no hedge funds in highly integrated markets. In perfectly 
integrated markets, both high and low inflation risk currencies are part of the global market 
portfolio that all agents hold in some positive quantities in equilibrium, as in Fama and Farber 
(1979).  
 
Proposition 2. Assume ρρ >  and LL kk < . A reduction in φ, the cost of becoming a speculator, 
leads to an increase in the number of speculators (which is equivalent to the flow of assets to the 
hedge fund), the convergence of the Sharpe ratios of the two countries’ domestic bonds, and a 
decrease in the expected future returns to the speculators’ hedge fund. A decrease in φ, through an 
increase in the number of speculators, leads to a rise in rL and a decrease in rH, a rise in bond price 
pH, and a decrease in bond price pL, and an increase in the exchange rate LH
HLS ππ // = . An 
increase in the number of speculators in period t affects positively the contemporaneous returns to 
the period t-1 speculators’ hedge fund. 
 
As Proposition 2 shows, an increase in the number of speculators affects interest rates 
and brings the two countries’ real interest rates and zero-coupon bond prices closer to each other. 
As bond prices drive the real purchasing power of the currencies, the exchange rate (12) is also 
affected. The interest rates and the exchange rate move toward values that they would have in an 
integrated economy with better risk sharing. 
 
Hedge funds have commonly been associated with simple currency carry trades (see, 
e.g., Galati, Heath, and McGuire, 2007), where the investors borrow in the low interest rate 
currency and invest in the high interest rate currency. When 
 
 14
argmax{ BdBAdA MM σσ , } = argmax{ 1,21,2 /,/ ++ tBtBdBtAtAdA EMEM πσπσ },  (17) 
 
the speculators’ hedge fund in our model engages in simple currency carry trades. In other words, in 
this case, currency L is also the currency with the lower interest rate. Note that the fact that the two 
strategies are not equal implies that sometimes the speculators’ optimal strategy is to borrow in the 
high interest rate (but low Sharpe ratio) currency and invest in the low interest rate (but high Sharpe 
ratio) currency. In this case the speculators invest in the high Sharpe ratio currency, borrowing at 
the real risk-free rate, and use the short position in the low Sharpe ratio currency to hedge their 
investment.  
 
The possible difference in the real interest rates that may occur in equilibrium due to 
variations in inflation risks and partial market integration leads to the failure of the uncovered 
interest rate parity. Denoting by Ri,t the period t nominal interest rate in country i, noting that the 
rate of inflation in country i equals 1/ 1,, −+titti E ππ , the uncovered interest rate parity is violated in 
equilibrium whenever 
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In our model, this occurs whenever investors are risk-averse and 1,21,2 // ++ ≠ tBtBdBtAtAdA EMEM πσπσ . The 
failure of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), when it occurs, is an equilibrium phenomenon. 
Under the assumption that Eq. (17) holds, the failure of UIP is larger, i.e., the ratio of the right- and 
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left-hand sides of (18) is further away from one when financial markets are segmented than when 
they are integrated.13  
 
4. The data 
We use a panel data set with data related to 11 main currencies spanning the time 
period from January 1979 to December 2008.14 The data are on a monthly frequency and contain 
3,120 currency-month observations. The selection of sample currencies and time period is driven by 
the availability of reliable data. Although ours is not a complete sample, we cannot think of any 
favorable systematic bias arising from the fact that not all possible currencies at all times have been 
included in our data set.15 
 
Testing the predictions of the model requires data on interest rates, exchange rates, 
inflation risks, per capita money supplies, and hedge fund flows, which we use as a proxy for the 
change in the number of speculators. First, we obtain end-of-month interbank spot and one-month 
forward exchange rates as well as one-month interbank interest rates from Datastream. To find a 
proxy for the time-varying inflation risk, ht, denoting by et the period t inflation shock, we estimate 
the following AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for the rate of inflation, dt:      
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13 Note that as investors become less risk averse, so that a→0, the interest rates in both countries 
approach the risk-free rate, given (6), and hence, the UIP will hold in the limit. 
14 The sample currencies are the main currencies of the Euro area (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands), Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data for the Euro legacy 
currencies end in December 1998 and data for the Euro area begin in January 1999. Our sample currencies are the same 
as those used by Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006).  
15 On the contrary, we believe that these countries provide for conservative tests of our hypotheses. Our 
sample consists of major industrial countries with developed financial markets and broadly comparable monetary 
policy. We believe that finding evidence of capital restrictions and their effect on financial markets in this set of 
countries is more revealing than in a broader set of countries including those with less-developed financial markets. 
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The model is estimated individually for each country using Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) data on the monthly rate of year-over-year inflation. We use 
the mean equation for dt as inflation forecasts and the time-varying variance term, ht2 as our proxy 
for the inflation risk. This approach is similar to those used by Grier and Perry (1998) and Hwang 
(2001), among others.  
 
Our proxy for per capita money supply is M2 divided by the respective country’s 
stock market capitalization. As the stock market capitalization reflects the size of the financial 
markets, we believe this ratio captures well a given country’s citizens’ ability to bear the inflation 
risk related to its monetary assets, thus capturing the intuition of the model.16 The data on M2 are 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF), National Bank of Belgium, Bank of England, and 
Mitchell (1992). These data are on a monthly frequency. In the few cases where monthly 
observations were not available, we calculated monthly estimates assuming that the growth of M2 
between annual observations was constant. Stock market capitalizations are from Datastream and 
World Federation of Exchanges.17   
 
Our proxy for the proportion of speculators is the hedge fund industry’s total assets 
under management (AUM) divided by the total M2 money supply of the sample countries. The 
procedure for estimating the hedge fund industry’s AUM is described in Appendix B. Fig. 1 shows 
the historical development of the hedge fund AUM divided by the total M2 money supply. The total 
hedge fund AUM grew from just over 0.2% of the total M2 in 1976 to over 6% in 2007. The 
development of the AUM occurs in cycles, where periods of rapid growth are followed by sharp 
                                                 
16 Second, in a more general model, such as Fama and Farber (1979), the market portfolios include the 
equity markets. In such a model, the relative sizes of the money supply and the equity market affect the covariance of 
inflation risk with the market portfolio, which in turn affects the equilibrium risk premium in nominal fixed income 
assets and the equilibrium interest rate in any given country. 
17 We use M2 instead of M3, for example, as this is available for all countries during our sample period. 
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falls. The last two sharp falls in the AUM were triggered by the Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) hedge fund crisis in 1998 and the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
 
We use the net flow of the new assets to hedge funds as our proxy for the change in 
the number of speculators. Flow is calculated as the difference between the change in the funds’ 
AUM and the funds’ monthly dollar returns. As before, we normalize the figures by dividing them 
by M2.18 We use the flow, rather than change in AUM, because of endogeneity problems related to 
the latter. We believe that using the asset flows is free of endogeneity problems as hedge funds 
typically require a notification period of up to several months prior to subscriptions and 
redemptions. The procedure for estimating flows is described in Appendix B. Panel A of Table 1 
provides the basic summary statistics of the key variables and rates of changes of the variables.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5. Do hedge funds engage in currency speculation? 
Our model predicts that in sufficiently non-integrated markets, speculators set up a 
hedge fund that borrows in currencies with low Sharpe ratios and invests in currencies with high 
Sharpe ratios. We refer to this strategy as the “risk-adjusted carry trade” strategy. When (17) holds, 
this strategy corresponds to the simple currency carry trade strategy, where investors borrow in low 
interest rate currencies and invest in high interest rate currencies. In this paper, we report the results 
based on both strategies. We do so because the results related to simple carry trade investments are 
                                                 
18 The normalization is done either using the aggregate M2 of our sample currencies or, in the case of 
panel regressions, using individual countries’ M2. The latter approach can be justified by noting that hedge fund flows 
are likely to have an amplified effect on interest rates and exchange rates of small currencies. 
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of interest on their own, as this particular investment strategy is popular and has been widely 
discussed in the literature. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar for the two 
investment strategies, as the returns and portfolio compositions of the two strategies are highly 
correlated. 
 
We consider the following investment strategies. At the end of each month, we rank 
the currencies according to their interest rates or estimated Sharpe ratios, which is defined as the 
nominal interest rate minus the expected inflation divided by the standard deviation of unexpected 
inflation. We borrow funds in the currencies that rank in the bottom third and invest in the top-third 
currencies. At the end of the next month, a new ranking is composed and new positions are entered 
into, accordingly. The borrowing and investing in currencies is executed through short and long 
positions in one-month currency forwards against the British pound.19 When analyzing the effects 
of currency speculation in the subsequent sections of this paper, we assume that all traders follow 
these particular strategies.20 
 
Our first prediction is that the expected returns to this type of currency speculation are 
positive. Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the monthly gross returns from 
our two investment strategies, and Fig. 2 shows the cumulative return, in British pounds, to a 
constant £100-size investment in the two long-short portfolios.  
 
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
 
                                                 
19 The choice of numeraire is inconsequential as the resulting short and long positions in the numeraire 
currency cancel out. 
20 Our simple carry trade strategy differs somewhat from that used by Burnside, Eichenbaum, 
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007) who take a long position in all the 
currencies that have a higher interest rate than the British pound and take a short position in all the currencies that have 
a lower interest rate than the British pound. Our approach of leaving out middle-ranking currencies matches that 
commonly used in the asset pricing literature and is similar to that used for currencies by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) 
and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2008). 
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The mean monthly return from the simple carry trade strategy is 0.47%, which 
corresponds to a 5.63% annual return. The standard deviation of the monthly returns is 2.06%, 
resulting in a monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.228 (0.789 annualized). The results for the risk-adjusted 
carry trade strategy are similar, with somewhat lower mean and higher standard deviation. The 
monthly Sharpe ratio of this strategy is 0.159.21, 22 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the means of the key variables and their changes when a 
currency belongs to the lowest-third (“short”) or the highest-third (“long”) based on our rankings of 
the sample currencies. Note that the real interest rates (nominal interest rate minus expected 
inflation) are higher for the long than the short currencies. Note also that the long currencies have 
higher per capita money supply when compared to the short currencies. This corresponds to our 
intuition that speculators should borrow from capital rich countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, 
or Japan, where M2 per stock market capitalization (or M2 per investor) is small, and invest the 
proceeds in less wealthy economies.  
 
Our second prediction is that hedge funds should invest in these types of currency 
carry trading strategies. Table 2 presents the correlation between returns from our two currency 
trading strategies and select Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indexes.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
                                                 
21 Since these are zero-investment strategies, Sharpe ratio is simply the average of returns divided by 
the standard deviation of returns. 
22 To allow for some comparison, over the same time period, the US stock market had an average 
monthly return of 0.96%, monthly standard deviation of 4.51%, and monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.109 (0.376 annualized). 
Our results, related to simple carry trades, are in line with those by Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo 
(2006), allowing for the fact that their method of constructing portfolios slightly differs from ours.  
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The returns from our strategies are highly correlated with the returns from various 
hedge fund indexes, indicating that hedge funds do, indeed, apply similar strategies to those that we 
have identified. Both of our strategies’ returns are highly correlated with the overall hedge fund 
index returns as well as with the returns to fixed income arbitrage, global macro, and multi-strategy 
sub-indexes. Incredibly, the risk-adjusted carry trade strategy explains 16% of the overall hedge 
fund index returns and 33% of the fixed income arbitrage sub-index returns.23 
 
To test if the returns to our currency trading strategies are significant in the presence 
of other risk factors, we regress the hedge fund index returns on a number of previously used risk 
factors as well as the returns from our two carry trade strategies. More precisely, we extend the 
seven hedge fund risk-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) by adding the returns to our trading 
strategies as the eighth factor.24 The results of regressing the returns of the broad hedge fund index 
as well as global macro, fixed income arbitrage, and multi-strategy indexes on the seven and eight 
factors are reported in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
All four hedge fund indexes presented have a statistically significant exposure to the 
currency carry trade factors, even in the presence of the other seven factors. The currency carry 
trade factors appear to be especially important for the global macro funds. The inclusion of the 
simple carry trade factor increases the model’s power to explain variation in global macro funds’ 
                                                 
23 Some additional evidence related to hedge funds’ exposure to individual currency carry trade pairs is 
presented in McGuire and Upper (2007). Our results related to simple carry trades are similar to those in Lyytinen 
(2007), who shows a positive correlation between currency carry trade and hedge fund returns, and Pojarliev and Levich 
(2008a, 2008b) who show that currency hedge fund returns are highly correlated with an index of carry trade returns. 
24 The seven factors used by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are three trend-following factors (for bonds, 
currencies, and commodities; Fung and Hsieh, 2001), an equity market factor (Standard & Poor’s 500), a size spread 
factor (Russell 2000 minus Standard & Poor’s 500), a bond market factor (monthly change in the ten-year treasury 
constant maturity yield), and a credit spread factor (monthly change in the Moody’s Baa yield minus ten-year treasury 
constant maturity yield). Data for the trend-following factors are available on David Hsieh’s Web site: 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls. 
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returns, measured by R-squared, from 19% to 28%. These findings suggest that hedge funds in 
general, and global macro and fixed income arbitrage funds in particular, engage in currency 
speculation using carry trades.    
 
6. Hedge fund flows and returns to carry trades 
Proposition 2 predicts that as barriers to international currency investments become 
smaller, new investors invest into hedge funds that engage in currency speculation. As the number 
of hedge fund investors increases, as the funds’ investments affect market prices, the expected 
returns from the currency speculation strategies applied by hedge funds decrease. The fitted 
polynomial trends to the cumulative returns from the two carry trade strategies, shown in Fig. 2, 
suggest that the returns from our strategies have indeed been decreasing over time, as the volume of 
assets under management in hedge funds has grown. To show this change in the profitability in 
another way, we divide our sample period into three sub periods based on the total hedge fund 
assets under management and present the returns and the Sharpe ratios for the two strategies in each 
of the time periods in Fig. 3.  
 
[Insert Fig. 3 here] 
 
During the first period, when hedge fund AUM is below USD 100 billion, the average 
monthly return to simple carry trade is 0.69% (0.51% for the risk-adjusted carry trade) whereas it is 
only 0.17% (0.17%) during the last period when hedge fund AUM is over USD 500 billion. Further, 
the monthly Sharpe ratio of the simple (risk-adjusted) carry trade strategy decreases from 0.37 
(0.27) in the first period to only 0.09 (0.09) in the last period.  
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To study further the relation between the number of speculators and the currency carry 
trade returns, we regress the returns from the two trading strategies on the previous month’s hedge 
fund AUM and the current month’s hedge fund flow and report the results in Table 4.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The hedge fund AUM has a negative and statistically significant effect on the returns 
to the simple carry trade strategy, whereas the current month’s hedge fund flow has a significant 
positive effect. These results, consistent with Proposition 2, hold for both raw returns (column 1) 
and Fama and French (1993) three-factor risk-adjusted returns (column 2). The results also exhibit 
economic significance. For instance, according to our estimates for the last five years of the sample 
period (2004–2008), a one-standard deviation increase in hedge fund flows results in a 0.08% 
increase in the simple carry trade returns, which corresponds to about 40% of this strategy’s returns’ 
standard deviation during the same period. The results related to the risk-adjusted carry trades are of 
the predicted direction, but their statistical significance is weak. 
 
7. Hedge fund flows and interest rates 
Proposition 2 predicts that an increase in the number of speculators will decrease 
(increase) the interest rate in the high (low) per capita inflation risk countries. To test this 
prediction, we regress the changes in the interest rates on hedge fund flows and changes in other 
determinants of interest rates in our model, namely forecast inflation, inflation risk, and M2 per 
stock market capitalization. The inflation forecasts are calculated as one-step-ahead forecasts from 
the inflation model presented in Eq. (19). Since the changes in interest rates exhibit strong negative 
autocorrelation, we also include the lagged interest rate change as an explanatory variable.  
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As we expect the hedge fund flows (corresponding to changes in the number of 
speculators) to have opposite effects on interest rates in high and low Sharpe ratio countries, or, 
assuming (17) holds, on high and low interest rates, we include an indicator variable in the 
regression to indicate whether the country belongs to a currency speculators’ short or long portfolio 
and interact this indicator variable with the hedge fund flows. The indicator variable, Position, 
equals minus one for countries that belong to the lowest one-third in the Sharpe ratio, or interest 
rate, ranking, plus one for countries that belong to the highest one-third, and zero for the rest. 
Results of regressing the changes in interest rates on changes in inflation forecast, inflation risk, 
money supplies, and the Position times the hedge fund flows are presented in Table 5. The Position 
variable is based on the Sharpe ratio rankings in column 1 and on the interest rate rankings in 
column 2.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Changes in interest rates are positively and statistically significantly related to changes 
in both inflation risk and money supply, providing empirical support for the baseline model. The 
finding that inflation risk is a significant determinant of interest rates is in line with studies such as 
Shen (1998) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) that show positive and significant inflation risk 
premiums in nominal interest rates.  
 
The hedge fund flows have a significant effect on interest rates in the direction 
predicted by the theoretical model: positive flow decreases (increases) the interest rates in high 
(low) Sharpe ratio, or interest rate, countries. Over the last five years of the sample period (2004–
2008), the time-series standard deviation of hedge fund flows per M2 was about 2%. Hence, a one-
standard deviation increase in hedge fund flows would result, on average, in a 0.07% decrease 
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(increase) in interest rates in the high (low) Sharpe ratio currencies. Such a change corresponds to 
about 29% of the standard deviation of interest rate changes over the same period, which is 
economically significant.25 
 
Proposition 2 further predicts that the Sharpe ratios of the fixed income assets in high- 
and low-interest rate countries should converge over time as the number of speculators increases. 
Such convergence is evident in Fig. 4, which shows the average Sharpe ratios for the long and short 
currencies in the two strategies.26 
 
[Insert Fig. 4 here] 
 
8. Hedge fund flows and exchange rates 
A final prediction of the model is that hedge fund flows (corresponding to changes in 
the number of speculators) affect exchange rates. The prediction is that inflows (outflows) to hedge 
funds will lead to an appreciation (depreciation) of high (low) Sharpe ratio or, assuming (17) holds, 
high (low) interest rate currencies. We examine this effect by regressing the changes in spot 
exchange rates on hedge fund flows, and forward premium, and present the results in Table 6. As 
we expect the hedge fund flows to have opposite effects on high and low Sharpe ratio (or interest 
rate) currencies, we interact the hedge fund flows with the Position variables described in Section 7. 
The Position variable is based on the Sharpe ratio rankings in column 1 and on the interest rate 
rankings in column 2. The spot exchange rate change is calculated for each currency against a 
                                                 
25 Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in hedge fund flows would result, on average, in a 0.06% 
decrease (increase) in interest rates in the high (low) interest rate currencies which corresponds to 23% of the standard 
deviation of interest rate changes. 
26 In addition, it seems that the Sharpe ratios for fixed income investments in general have fallen over 
time, possibly reflecting better risk sharing in integrated markets.  
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basket containing all the other currencies in the sample. In this way, we mitigate problems arising 
from using a single currency as a numeraire.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The effect of hedge fund flows on spot exchange rates is significantly positive. During 
months of positive flows, high Sharpe ratio (or high interest rate) currencies appreciate and low 
Sharpe ratio (or low interest rate) currencies depreciate. Based on estimates from the last five years 
of the sample period (2004–2008), a one-standard deviation increase in hedge fund flows would, on 
average, result in a 0.09% appreciation (depreciation) in the exchange rate of the high (low) Sharpe 
ratio currencies. Such a change corresponds to about 4% of the standard deviation of exchange rate 
changes over the same period, which is economically significant.27 
 
The results above are in line with those of Evans and Lyons (2002) who find, using 
daily data, that deal flow explains a large part of variation in exchange rates. The difference is that 
we are able to trace the origin of some of the deal flow to hedge funds engaged in currency 
speculation. A similar prediction to ours—that carry trades affect exchange rates—is present in 
Plantin and Shin (2010) and Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009). 
 
During the latter half of 2008, hedge funds experienced a dramatic outflow of capital, 
with the total industry AUM falling from almost USD 2 trillion by the end of June to USD 1.4 
trillion by the end of the year. During this time period, the hedge fund redemptions totaled 17.5% of 
AUM which corresponds to 4.3 times the standard deviation of the semi-annual flows. At the same 
time, consistent with Proposition 2, high Sharpe ratio (high interest rate) currencies depreciated 
                                                 
27 Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in flows would, on average, result in a 0.19% appreciation (depreciation) 
in the exchange rate of the high (low) interest rate currencies, which corresponds to about 8% of the standard deviation 
of exchange rate changes. 
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significantly while low Sharpe ratio (low interest rate) currencies appreciated. On average, the carry 
trade short currencies based on the Sharpe ratio (interest rate) rankings appreciated by 6.2% 
(15.4%) while the carry trade long currencies depreciated by 10.9 (11%) relative to baskets of all 
other currencies. The magnitude of these currency changes is, on average, 2.2 (3.6) times the 
standard deviation of the semi-annual exchange rate changes. Based on the estimates in Table 6, 
hedge fund flows can account for 26% (22%) of the average appreciation of the low Sharpe ratio 
(interest rate) currencies and 7% (11%) of the average depreciation of high Sharpe ratio (interest 
rate) currencies during this time period.  According to our estimates, therefore, in the fall of 2008, 
the carry trade long currencies depreciated by roughly 2.3–4.6% against the carry trade short 
currencies due to hedge fund flows, providing additional evidence of the economic significance of 
the effect of hedge fund flows on exchange rates.28 
 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study a two-country general equilibrium model with partially 
segmented markets for nominal fixed income securities. In sufficiently segmented markets, when 
inflation shocks are highly correlated, all unrestricted investors invest in a leveraged hedge fund 
that borrows from the country with the lower Sharpe ratio for fixed income securities while 
investing in the country with the higher Sharpe ratio. Under certain assumptions, this strategy 
coincides with the simple carry trade strategy, where investment decisions are based on interest rate 
as opposed to Sharpe ratio rankings. In our model, hedge funds play a positive economic role, 
                                                 
28 There are at least two reasons, however, why the extreme exchange rate changes in the fall of 2008 
may be even to a greater extent due to the unwinding of the hedge funds’ carry trade positions. First, one should 
recognize that the large hedge fund outflows in the fall of 2008 occurred at the time of a global credit crisis. Given 
this, the hedge funds have most likely unwound their positions in 2008 not only due to the outflow of money from the 
funds, but also in an effort to decrease in their leverage ratios, as during this time period the availability of funding 
credit became very tight. This is, in fact, what Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009) argue is the case. Second, 
as predicted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), it is likely that during the credit crises the liquidity in all markets, 
including the currency market, was exceptionally low. This implies that at that time the unwinding of the hedge funds’ 
carry trade positions probably had a much greater effect on exchange rates, as compared to normal times, as in the fall 
of 2008 also all the other market participants, who normally provide liquidity to the market, were highly constrained. 
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transferring money from a country with little domestic inflation risk to a country with higher 
inflation risk, leading to better international risk sharing and an increase in the utilities of all agents. 
When the costs for making international financial transactions decrease, more investors invest in the 
hedge fund, whose investments affect market interest rates, the exchange rate, and both the hedge 
fund’s contemporaneous and expected future returns.  
 
Empirically, we show that a long-short investment strategy that is based on the 
rankings of currencies by their estimated Sharpe ratios (or interest rates) can explain a large fraction 
of various hedge fund index returns, implying that hedge funds do engage in this type of currency 
speculation. Our evidence suggests that the hedge fund industry is also large enough, so that the 
hedge funds’ investments have affected market prices in the fixed income and currency markets. 
Our estimate of the total hedge fund industry’s assets under management was, in recent years, close 
to 6% of the M2 money supply of our sample currencies, which include the currencies of the largest 
industrialized countries in the world. When assessing the magnitude of this amount, recognizing 
that hedge funds pursue many different strategies in addition to those that we have identified, one 
must also recognize that the hedge fund investments are typically highly leveraged, amplifying the 
amount of money that may have been invested in such trades.29 Given the huge volume of leveraged 
assets under management, it is hardly surprising that the flow of hedge fund assets under 
management has had a statistically significant price effect in the fixed income and currency 
markets.  
 
Our results also shed some light on the forward premium puzzle, which has attracted 
much attention in academia. In our model, the uncovered interest rate parity does not typically hold 
in equilibrium, as real interest rates differ across countries due to variations in inflation risks and 
                                                 
29 In the past, leverage ratios of up to 12:1 have been estimated for some types of hedge funds (see 
McGuire, Remolona, and Tsatsaronis, 2005). 
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money supplies. Furthermore, under certain assumptions which, according to our estimates are 
typically satisfied, the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity is larger in segmented financial 
markets as opposed to an integrated financial market. Under the same assumptions, the process of 
market integration leads to additional hedge fund investments into high real interest rate currencies, 
which in turn leads to the appreciation of those currencies, and to short selling and the subsequent 
depreciation of the low interest rate currencies. Consequently, according to our results, it is likely 
that the market integration during the past few decades has biased upwards the empirical estimates 
of the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity.   
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Appendix A. Proofs  
Proof of Proposition 1. The claim that the hedge fund’s expected returns are positive follows from 
the fact that zero positions are also feasible. The proof of all other claims follows directly from Eqn. 
(9) and the first partial derivative of (9) with respect to ki and kj, and are omitted. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, using (5), (8) and (10) we obtain: 
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decrease as ki increases. Differentiating (21) with respect to *dLb and 
*d
Hb , and using (10) to sign the 
derivatives, gives:  
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when LL kk < . This provides the result as 0
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the range of parameters considered. These last two partial derivatives also prove our claim that the 
Sharpe ratios converge, as the number of speculators increases, as given (7) and (23), we have  
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This result also implies, given (13), that all the speculators, when LL kk < , come from country L. 
 
We now prove that a decrease in φ leads to an increase in the number of speculators. 
In equilibrium, the utilities of the two types of investors must be equal. Following a decrease in φ, 
other things equal, the speculators’ utility is higher than that for the domestic investors, prompting 
more domestic investors to turn into speculators. As we show below, an increase in the number of 
speculators increases domestic investors’ utility relative to the utility of the speculators. Entry of 
speculators continues until the utilities are again equal.  
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where we have made use of the fact that the first-order condition of (2) with respect to t,im  implies 
that the domestic investors and speculators select equal money holdings in equilibrium.  
 
As φ decreases, (25) increases. When LL kk < , (10) implies that the first term in the 
exponential of (25), in equilibrium, 2
2*
2
a2
L
d
Lb σ− , is decreasing in the number of speculators. We 
now want to show that the second term in the exponential is also decreasing in the number of 
speculators.  
         
Differentiating this term with respect to *dHb  and 
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by (22). Similarly by (23),    
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This proves the result as 0
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b  given (10), for the range of parameters considered. 
 
The remaining results regarding the interest rates, bond prices, and the 
contemporaneous profits to the hedge fund follow from (5), (6), and the derivative of (10) with 
respect to ki and kj.    
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Appendix B. Estimation procedures    
 
It is quite difficult to obtain reliable monthly estimates for the hedge fund industry’s 
AUM dating back in time. First, Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR) provides annual estimates of the 
hedge fund industry’s total AUM from 1990 onwards. Second, we find some evidence on the size of 
the markets for the earlier period from Hennessee Group LLC, but it is only for the years 1974 and 
1987. In addition, we use the Lipper TASS database, which provides monthly observations on 
individual funds dating back to 1977, and covers a large (currently 80%) but varying proportion of 
the total hedge fund industry. 
 
To form a monthly series of the hedge fund AUM, we start with the annual estimates 
of the total hedge fund AUM by HFR and the two earlier estimates by Hennessee. Next, we 
calculate asset-weighted averages of returns and new asset flows to all the funds included in the 
Lipper TASS database for each month. As the year-to-year asset growth of the Lipper TASS funds 
does not match the growth in the hedge fund industry indicated by the estimates provided by HFR 
and Hennessee, due to the changing coverage in Lipper TASS, we make the assumption that each 
year the difference between the two growth figures accumulates steadily over the year. Hence, our 
estimated hedge fund AUM growth is the asset-weighted average growth in the AUM of the hedge 
funds reporting to the Lipper TASS database plus one-twelfth of the difference in the current year’s 
asset growth estimates obtained from HFR or Hennessee and the Lipper TASS database. In this 
way, we get a monthly estimate of the hedge fund AUM whose end-of-year figure matches the 
estimates of HFR and Hennessee and whose monthly growth pattern resembles as closely as 
possible that of the population of funds reporting to the Lipper TASS database.30 
                                                 
30 Some discussion on the difficulties of finding good proxies to measure carry trade activity can be 
found in Galati, Heath, and McGuire (2007). 
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Our estimate of the hedge fund industry’s asset flow is based on all funds in the 
Lipper TASS database and our AUM estimates. We calculate an estimate of percentage asset flow 
to each fund for each month, when reported asset and return figures are available, take an asset-
weighted average of these percentage flows, and multiply this by our estimate of the total hedge 
fund industry AUM to obtain an estimate of the flow in dollar terms.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A gives the means, standard deviations, medians, and the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the 
variables used in this study. Panel B presents the means for those currency-month observations that belong to the carry 
trade short or long portfolios, respectively. Interest rate is the one-month interbank interest rate, inflation forecast is 
based on Eq. (19), inflation risk is the annualized standard deviation of the error term of the inflation Eq. (19), money 
supply is M2 scaled by stock market capitalization, exchange rate and forward premium are expressed per an equal-
weighted basket of the other sample currencies, country specific hedge fund flow is the net flow of new assets to hedge 
funds, in dollars, scaled by the M2 money supply of the country, non-country specific hedge fund flow is the net flow of 
new assets to hedge funds, in dollars, scaled by the total M2 money supply of all the sample countries, carry trade is the 
monthly return to our carry trade strategy, risk-adjusted carry trade is the monthly return to Sharpe ratio ranking-based 
investment strategy, and hedge fund AUM is the assets under management of the hedge fund industry scaled by the total 
M2 money supply of the sample countries. Δ denotes monthly change in the variable. The sample period is from 1979/1 
through 2008/12 and the sample countries are Belgium, Canada, Euro area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All data are on a monthly frequency. The number 
of observations for country specific variables is 3,120 and for non-country specific variables, the number of 
observations is 360. 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistic 
  Mean Std. 25% Median 75%
Country specific  
Interest rate 0.0691 0.0465 0.0363 0.0597 0.0938
Δ Interest rate -0.0002 0.0128 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0014
Inflation forecast 0.0366 0.0329 0.0170 0.0276 0.0456
Δ Inflation forecast -0.0001 0.0037 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0018
Inflation risk1 0.0135 0.0141 0.0097 0.0116 0.0143
Δ Inflation risk2 0.0002 0.1600 -0.0754 -0.0387 0.0180
Money supply 2.0477 3.6562 0.7599 1.2670 1.8429
Δ Money supply -0.0042 0.0570 -0.0367 -0.0064 0.0253
Δ Exchange rate 0.0000 0.0209 -0.0112 -0.0002 0.0110
Forward premium 0.0000 0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0016
Δ Forward premium 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002
Hedge fund flow3 0.0035 0.0142 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0040
Non-country specific      
Risk-adjusted carry trade 0.0034 0.0215 -0.0049 0.0048 0.0147
Carry trade 0.0047 0.0206 -0.0050 0.0067 0.0172
Hedge fund AUM 0.0192 0.0181 0.0036 0.0125 0.0325
Hedge fund flow (×100)3 0.0158 0.0448 -0.0015 0.0066 0.0321
      
PANEL B: Means  Risk-adjusted carry trade           Carry trade 
  Short Long Short Long
Interest rate 0.0486 0.0877 0.0387 0.0982
Δ Interest rate -0.0012 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0007
Inflation forecast 0.0339 0.0395 0.0204 0.0533
Δ Inflation forecast 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002
Inflation risk1 0.0153 0.0111 0.0131 0.0141
Δ Inflation risk2 0.0035 -0.0097 -0.0012 0.0032
Money supply 1.9647 2.1837 1.4849 3.2781
Δ Money supply -0.0046 -0.0034 -0.0023 -0.0032
Δ Exchange rate 0.0009 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0002
Forward premium -0.0018 0.0019 -0.0029 0.0030
Δ Forward premium -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
Hedge fund flow3 0.0035 0.0033 0.0040 0.0027
1  The level of inflation risk is expressed as the annualized standard deviation of the error term of the inflation Eq. (19).  
2  Changes in inflation risk and money supply are expressed as changes in the logarithmic value as they enter the 
regressions in this form. 
3 The country specific hedge fund flow uses the country’s M2 as the scaling variable, whereas the non-country specific 
flow uses the total M2 of all the sample countries. 
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Table 2 
Correlations with hedge fund returns 
This table presents the correlations between currency carry trade returns and various hedge fund 
indexes. Results in column 1 are based on the risk-adjusted carry trade strategy, and results in column 2 are based on 
returns to the simple carry trade strategy. Monthly return data for the hedge fund indexes are from Credit 
Suisse/Tremont and span the period from 1994/1 through 2008/12 (180 observations), except for multi-strategy for 
which data begin in 1994/4 (177 observations). t-values are reported in parentheses for the test that the correlation is 
equal to zero. 
  (1) (2)
All hedge funds 0.4029 0.3246
 (5.87) (4.58)
Fixed income arbitrage 0.5779 0.4106
 (9.45) (6.01)
Global macro 0.3608 0.2873
 (5.16) (4.00)
Multi-strategy 0.3550 0.2495
  (5.02) (3.41)
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Table 3 
Carry trade factor in hedge fund index returns 
This table presents the results of regressing returns of four hedge fund indexes on the seven risk factors 
introduced by Fung and Hsieh (2001) and currency carry trade returns. Results in columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 are based on 
returns to risk-adjusted carry trade strategy, and results in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 are based on simple carry trade 
returns. Monthly return data for the hedge fund indexes are from Credit Suisse/Tremont and span the period from 
1994/1 through 2008/12 (180 observations), except for multi-strategy for which data begin in 1994/4 (177 
observations). Data for the Fung and Hsieh factors are available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- consistent t-values (Newey and West, 1987) are reported in parentheses.  
  All hedge funds Global macro Fixed income arbitrage Multi-strategy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant 0.0055 0.0044 0.0042 0.0091 0.0075 0.0071 0.0040 0.0031 0.0033 0.0062 0.0058 0.0059
 (4.56) (3.83) (3.66) (4.75) (3.73) (3.45) (3.48) (2.82) (2.77) (5.04) (4.71) (4.67)
Bond trend -0.0294 -0.0270 -0.0263 -0.0295 -0.0260 -0.0246 -0.0158 -0.0139 -0.0141 -0.0067 -0.0052 -0.0054
 (-2.60) (-2.50) (-2.33) (-1.88) (-1.70) (-1.50) (-2.17) (-1.93) (-1.99) (-0.64) (-0.49) (-0.51)
Currency trend 0.0099 0.0171 0.0181 0.0152 0.0257 0.0280 -0.0095 -0.0040 -0.0052 0.0071 0.0100 0.0093
 (1.34) (2.27) (2.51) (1.06) (1.85) (2.10) (-1.56) (-0.80) (-1.02) (1.12) (1.72) (1.69)
Commodity trend 0.0182 0.0188 0.0206 0.0191 0.0200 0.0229 0.0085 0.0090 0.0098 0.0034 0.0037 0.0040
 (1.63) (1.93) (2.12) (0.98) (1.14) (1.27) (1.20) (1.58) (1.54) (0.48) (0.57) (0.59)
Equity market 0.2568 0.2714 0.2666 0.1414 0.1630 0.1567 -0.0047 0.0067 0.0005 0.0398 0.0450 0.0419
 (5.48) (6.66) (6.91) (1.70) (2.17) (2.19) (-0.13) (0.21) (0.02) (1.27) (1.42) (1.38)
Size spread 0.1643 0.1507 0.1598 0.0471 0.0271 0.0400 -0.0052 -0.0158 -0.0077 0.0226 0.0167 0.0212
 (2.89) (2.72) (3.07) (0.70) (0.43) (0.67) (-0.30) (-0.94) (-0.44) (0.83) (0.64) (0.78)
Bond market -0.0191 -0.0118 -0.0197 -0.0378 -0.0269 -0.0386 -0.0207 -0.0149 -0.0210 -0.0086 -0.0054 -0.0086
 (-3.20) (-1.84) (-3.75) (-4.77) (-3.50) (-5.13) (-4.15) (-3.04) (-4.48) (-1.73) (-1.10) (-1.80)
Credit spread -0.0261 -0.0085 -0.0172 -0.0380 -0.0120 -0.0240 -0.0651 -0.0513 -0.0603 -0.0421 -0.0350 -0.0397
 (-2.84) (-0.80) (-2.28) (-2.48) (-0.70) (-1.93) (-5.38) (-6.00) (-5.21) (-4.75) (-4.38) (-4.49)
Currency speculation   0.2992 0.3054   0.4417 0.4786   0.2346 0.1640   0.1227 0.0840
    (3.63) (3.58)   (2.93) (2.83)   (4.65) (2.75)   (2.20) (1.14)
R-squared 0.468 0.535 0.532 0.187 0.271 0.276 0.502 0.574 0.534 0.298 0.322 0.309
Monthly observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 177 177 177
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Table 4  
Returns to carry trades and hedge fund flows 
This table gives the results of regressing monthly returns to currency carry trades on proxies of the 
number of speculators and changes therein. Results in columns 1 and 2 are based on returns to a risk-adjusted carry 
trade strategy, and results in columns 3 and 4 are based on returns to a simple carry trade strategy. The proxy for the 
number of speculators is the total hedge fund assets under management (AUM) scaled by the total M2 money supply of 
the sample countries. The proxy for changes in the number of speculators is the net flow of new funds to hedge funds, 
scaled by the total M2 money supply of the sample countries. Mkt-R, HML, and SMB are the three Fama and French 
(1993) risk factors. The sample period is from 1979/1 through 2008/12. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent t-values (Newey and West, 1987) are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent: carry trade return (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.0053 0.0045 0.0073 0.0067 
 (3.29) (2.73) (4.75) (4.38) 
Hedge fund flow 10.1932 8.9559 8.9945 8.1611 
 (1.69) (1.70) (3.75) (3.47) 
Hedge fund AUM (t-1) -0.1832 -0.1609 -0.2133 -0.1967 
 (-1.90) (-1.85) (-3.57) (-3.35) 
Mkt-Rf  0.0640  0.0486 
  (1.64)  (1.88) 
SMB  -0.0045  0.0188 
  (-0.10)  (0.48) 
HML  0.0714  0.0380 
  (1.59)  (0.93) 
R-squared 0.053 0.068 0.056 0.065 
Monthly observations 360 360 360 360 
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Table 5 
Changes in interest rates, inflation risk, money supply and hedge fund flows 
This table gives the results of regressing monthly changes in interest rates on lagged changes in interest 
rate, changes in forecasted inflation, logarithm of inflation risk (fitted value from a GARCH(1,1) model on monthly 
inflation), logarithm of money supply (M2 divided by stock market capitalization), and hedge fund flow (scaled by M2 
money supply). Hedge fund flow is interacted with the position variable (equal to one if the country is in the long 
portfolio during the month, negative one if the country is in the short portfolio during the month, and zero otherwise) to 
allow for opposite effects for high and low Sharpe ratio (or interest rate) countries. The position variable in column 1 is 
based on Sharpe ratio ranking, and in column 2 on interest rate ranking. The sample period is from 1979/1 through 
2008/12 and the sample countries are Belgium, Canada, Euro area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Country and month fixed effects are included in the 
estimation. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values (Arellano, 1987) are reported in parentheses.  
Dependent: Δ interest rate  (1) (2)
Δ Interest rate (t-1) -0.3197 -0.3133
 (-9.30) (-9.34)
Δ Inflation forecast 0.0997 0.0741
 (2.24) (1.68)
Δ Log(inflation risk) 0.0014 0.0007
 (2.15) (1.32)
Δ Log(money supply) 0.0153 0.0161
 (2.19) (2.31)
Position × Hedge fund flow -0.0366 -0.0292
 (-3.78) (-2.76)
Position 0.0024 0.0019
 (3.79) (4.14)
Hedge fund flow -0.0218 -0.0192
 (-1.87) (-1.75)
R-squared 0.288 0.278
Monthly observations 3,120 3,120
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Table 6 
Changes in exchange rates and number of speculators 
This table gives the results of regressing monthly changes in spot exchange rates on the level of 
forward premium, the change in forward premium, and hedge fund flow (scaled by M2 money supply). Hedge fund 
flow is interacted with the position variable (equal to one if the country is in the carry trade long portfolio during the 
month, minus one if the country is in the carry trade short portfolio during the month, and zero otherwise) to allow for 
opposite effects for high and low Sharpe ratio (or interest rate) currencies. The position variable in column 1 is based on 
Sharpe ratio ranking, and in column 2 on interest rate ranking. The spot exchange rate change is calculated for each 
currency as a change in the value of the currency against a basket containing all the other currencies in the sample. 
Hence, a positive (negative) change indicates appreciation (depreciation) of the currency. The sample period is from 
1979/1 through 2008/12 and the sample countries are Belgium, Canada, Euro area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Country fixed effects are included in the 
estimation. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values (Arellano, 1987) are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent: Δ exchange rate  (1) (2)
Forward premium (t-1) 0.6226 0.4620
 (1.70) (1.34)
Δ Forward premium 1.2247 1.1491
 (2.27) (2.01)
Position × Hedge fund flow 0.0466 0.0941
 (2.71) (2.21)
Position 0.0017 0.0023
 (3.19) (2.07)
Hedge fund flow 0.0177 0.0439
 (0.64) (1.41)
R-squared 0.015 0.016
Monthly observations 3,120 3,120
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Fig. 1 
Historical development of hedge fund assets under management. This figure shows the monthly development of the 
hedge fund industry’s total assets under management (AUM) divided by the total M2 money supply of the sample 
countries (Belgium, Canada, Euro area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) from 1979/1 to 2008/12.  
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Sources: Hennessee, HFR, Lipper TASS, authors’ estimates (see Appendix B for details). 
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Fig. 2 
Cumulative performance of carry trade strategies. This figure shows the cumulative return, in British pounds, to a 
constant £100-size investment in carry trade strategies from 1979/1 to 2008/12. The bold lines present the cumulative 
carry trade returns and the dotted lines present second-order polynomial trends fitted to the cumulative return data.  
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Fig. 3 
Carry trade performance and hedge fund assets under management. This figure shows the monthly mean returns (black 
bar, left scale) and Sharpe ratios (grey bar, right scale) of the two carry trade strategies when the total hedge fund assets 
under management has been below USD 100 billion (1979–1992), between USD 100 billion and USD 500 billion 
(1993–2000), and above USD 500 billion (2001–2008).  
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Fig. 4 
Sharpe ratios of fixed income investments. This figure shows the development of the average Sharpe ratios of the one-
month fixed income securities in long and short countries of the two carry trade strategies. The Sharpe ratio is defined 
as the nominal return on the fixed income asset minus expected inflation divided by the standard deviation of 
unexpected inflation. To smooth out random noise, the graphs depict five-year moving averages of the Sharpe ratios. 
The sample period is from 1984/1 through 2008/12.  
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